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Abstract 
Background Outbreaks of infectious disease cause serious and costly health and social problems. Two 
new technologies – pathogen whole genome sequencing (WGS) and Big Data analytics – promise to 
improve our capacity to detect and control outbreaks earlier, saving lives and resources. However, 
routinely using these technologies to capture more detailed and specific personal information could be 
perceived as intrusive and a threat to privacy. Method Four community juries were convened in two 
demographically different Sydney municipalities and two regional cities in New South Wales, Australia 
(western Sydney, Wollongong, Tamworth, eastern Sydney) to elicit the views of well-informed community 
members on the acceptability and legitimacy of: making pathogen WGS and linked administrative data 
available for public health research using this information in concert with data linkage and machine 
learning to enhance communicable disease surveillance systems Fifty participants of diverse 
backgrounds, mixed genders and ages were recruited by random-digit-dialling and topic-blinded social-
media advertising. Each jury was presented with balanced factual evidence supporting different expert 
perspectives on the potential benefits and costs of technologically enhanced public health research and 
communicable disease surveillance and given the opportunity to question experts. Results Almost all 
jurors supported data linkage and WGS on routinely collected patient isolates for the purposes of public 
health research, provided standard de-identification practices were applied. However, allowing this 
information to be operationalised as a syndromic surveillance system was highly contentious with three 
juries voting in favour, and one against by narrow margins. For those in favour, support depended on 
several conditions related to system oversight and security being met. Those against were concerned 
about loss of privacy and did not trust Australian governments to run secure and effective systems. 
Conclusions Participants across all four events strongly supported the introduction of data linkage and 
pathogenomics to public health research under current research governance structures. Combining 
pathogen WGS with event-based data surveillance systems, however, is likely to be controversial because 
of a lack of public trust, even when the potential public health benefits are clear. Any suggestion of private 
sector involvement or commercialisation of WGS or surveillance data was unanimously rejected. 
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Abstract
Background: Outbreaks of infectious disease cause serious and costly health and social problems. Two new
technologies – pathogen whole genome sequencing (WGS) and Big Data analytics – promise to improve our capacity
to detect and control outbreaks earlier, saving lives and resources. However, routinely using these technologies to
capture more detailed and specific personal information could be perceived as intrusive and a threat to privacy.
Method: Four community juries were convened in two demographically different Sydney municipalities and two
regional cities in New South Wales, Australia (western Sydney, Wollongong, Tamworth, eastern Sydney) to elicit the
views of well-informed community members on the acceptability and legitimacy of:
 making pathogen WGS and linked administrative data available for public health research
 using this information in concert with data linkage and machine learning to enhance communicable disease
surveillance systems
Fifty participants of diverse backgrounds, mixed genders and ages were recruited by random-digit-dialling and topic-
blinded social-media advertising. Each jury was presented with balanced factual evidence supporting different expert
perspectives on the potential benefits and costs of technologically enhanced public health research and
communicable disease surveillance and given the opportunity to question experts.
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Results: Almost all jurors supported data linkage and WGS on routinely collected patient isolates for the purposes of
public health research, provided standard de-identification practices were applied. However, allowing this information
to be operationalised as a syndromic surveillance system was highly contentious with three juries voting in favour, and
one against by narrow margins. For those in favour, support depended on several conditions related to system
oversight and security being met. Those against were concerned about loss of privacy and did not trust Australian
governments to run secure and effective systems.
Conclusions: Participants across all four events strongly supported the introduction of data linkage and
pathogenomics to public health research under current research governance structures. Combining pathogen WGS
with event-based data surveillance systems, however, is likely to be controversial because of a lack of public trust, even
when the potential public health benefits are clear. Any suggestion of private sector involvement or commercialisation
of WGS or surveillance data was unanimously rejected.
Keywords: Social licence, Data-linkage, Infectious disease, Pathogenomics, Public health surveillance, Public
deliberation
Background
Outbreaks of infectious diseases can cause significant and
costly health and social problems [1–4]. In Australia (and
internationally) communicable disease risks are monitored
through three core public health activities: (i) outbreak in-
vestigations; (ii) disease surveillance; and, (iii) public health
research [5]. They all rely on systematic data collection to
direct health resources and initiate public health actions in
response to communicable disease risks and outbreaks.
Two new technologies - pathogen whole genome sequen-
cing (WGS; pathogenomics) and ‘Big Data’ analytics - could
greatly enhance communicable disease control [6]. WGS is
the ultimate microbiological strain-typing method. Effective
communicable disease prevention and control depends on
the accurate identification and characterisation of the causal
pathogen - including the strain involved [7–9]. Increasingly
sophisticated strain-typing methods have been developed
over the past 20 years but, until recently, they have been ex-
pensive, time-consuming and/or poorly discriminatory.
WGS systems that are faster, cheaper and more informative
are being introduced into public health laboratories [10–
13]. Their integration into infectious disease diagnosis and
management will dramatically improve the accuracy and
speed of pathogen identification and biological risk predic-
tion. WGS produce universally understood data expressed
in the sequence of nucleotides which can be used to recon-
struct transmission pathways, highlight missing cases, and,
potentially, locate an individual at the time of exposure
[14–16]. Pathogen WGS is already being used in public
health surveillance systems in Australia [17] and elsewhere
[18–22]. Because infectious disease risks are universal, there
are global calls for equitable sharing of WGS-based
surveillance data to help distribute the benefits [23].
The increasing availability of pathogen sequence data
will provide new resources for communicable disease
research, control and surveillance at local, national
and global scales [24, 25].
Meanwhile, advances in informatics have revolutio-
nised the scope, accessibility and speed of data collection
and analysis. “Big Data” refers to the rapidly escalating
volume, velocity and variety of data produced and
stored; “Big Data analytics” refers to ‘the process of col-
lecting, organising and analysing large datasets, to dis-
cover patterns and generate useful, actionable
information’ [26]. Technological innovation that assists
collection, collation and interpretation of health-related
information could enhance the efficiency and accuracy
of communicable disease surveillance and outbreak in-
vestigation [27–29]. Government service providers hold
large administrative datasets, and masses of data are
generated by everyday life, for example retail transac-
tions and internet and mobile phone use. If pathogen
WGS data were linked to administrative and other data
– such as geospatial tracking in mobile phones (GPS)
and social media use for example – and examined sys-
tematically through an automated system, this informa-
tion could be mined to uncover epidemiological
associations much faster than traditional approaches
[30]. The algorithms that analyse surveillance data have
evolved substantially over the last decade [31]; incorpor-
ating them and novel information sources into estab-
lished systems should provide earlier warning, more
accurate monitoring and less uncertainty during early
stages of outbreaks [25, 29, 32].
Current systems in New South Wales (NSW), Australia
(as in many other jurisdictions) collect selected commu-
nicable disease-related data without individual consent
under the powers granted by the Public Health Act 2010
[33]. This is justified by the need to operationalise public
health protection, but tempered by a requirement that
data are used only for public health purposes and personal
information is protected [34, 35]. The benefits of earlier
outbreak detection and response are significant. More ex-
pedient and specific interventions can limit the health and
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socioeconomic impacts of infectious diseases, but surveil-
lance has political, personal and ethical implications [36,
37]. Risks include the use of flawed methods (as illustrated
by Google Flu Trends®, which proved to have poor reli-
ability) [38–40]. A trade-off may be required between data
accuracy and privacy. Outbreak prediction or modelling
based on inadequate data can have devastating economic,
health and social consequences, but collecting, holding
and sharing personal health information is a threat to
privacy, no matter how great the potential benefits [41].
For example, WGS pathogen “fingerprinting” linked to
clinical, epidemiological and spatiotemporal data will re-
veal information normally regarded as private (e.g. where
a person has been, who they were with and the type of ac-
tivity involved) [42–44]. Digital epidemiology – population
disease detection and monitoring using ‘Big Data’ – raises
similar issues [45]. Currently in public health research,
data are de-identified and so might be assumed to be an-
onymous. However, in the absence of strict security mea-
sures, reidentification may be possible; re-identification
usually can be achieved using linked metadata and other
data sources, and hacking remains an ever-present risk
[46–48].
This project was initiated because of concerns about
the potential privacy implications of using WGS tech-
nologies to characterise the relationship between micro-
bial isolates taken from patients. Potential implications
of human genome sequencing were outside of the scope
of this study. Decisions, about what data should be col-
lected and what action thresholds are used, are not just
matters for experts [37]. To secure social licence, these
systems must align with community values; this can be
facilitated by structured public dialogue to develop ethic-
ally and legally defensible justification for their design
and operation [6, 49]. In this paper, we report on four
community juries convened to consider the acceptability
and legitimacy of using new technologies to enhance
public health research and communicable disease sur-
veillance. Research suggests that while the public tacitly
accepts public health surveillance, they are less consist-
ently convinced of the benefits of the secondary use of
data for medical research [50–54]. Our aim was to ascer-
tain, by means of community juries, the conditions
under which a well-informed citizenry would or would
not accept integration of pathogen WGS and Big Data
analytics into communicable disease control, and why.
Methods
Community juries and other forms of ‘mini-publics’ are
an established and appropriate method of incorporating
public values and preferences into health policy
decision-making [55]. Unlike focus groups and surveys,
they involve information exchange and constructive dia-
logue between members of the public and experts, with
adequate time for consideration [56, 57]. The process is
based on deliberative democratic theory; it is like a legal
proceeding, except that outputs are not binding, Jurors’
decisions or recommendations provide evidence for pol-
icymaking [58, 59]. Members of the general public are
brought together to receive detailed factual information
about, and deliberate on values-based considerations
[60]. They are given opportunities for discussion with
experts and time to deliberate, before being asked to
come to a consensus or majority verdict [56]. The
method assumes that people can think rationally, revise
their opinions on the basis of evidence, and make de-
fensible decisions when provided with appropriate con-
ditions. Community juries have been used in Australia
and elsewhere to consider, for example, the introduction
of new health technologies and health resource priori-
tisation [60–63].
Drawing on the outcomes of a preparatory Delphi
process [49], we consulted a dozen relevant Australian
policymakers and public health practitioners (including
several State/Territory Chief Health Officers, directors of
communicable disease branches and public health la-
boratories which employ WGS based surveillance of
communicable diseases) to design the questions for the
juries’ consideration (Fig. 1). Our study was approved by
the Human Ethics Research Committee at the University
of Wollongong.
To capture metropolitan and regional perspectives, we
convened four community juries in NSW: Jury #1, west-
ern Sydney; Jury #2, Wollongong (south-eastern regional
NSW); Jury #3, Tamworth (north-western regional
NSW); and Jury #4, eastern Sydney. All were held over
two days between November 2018 and March 2019.
Western and eastern Sydney are large metropolitan
communities of approximately 3 million people each;
eastern Sydney is more urban and generally charac-
terised by higher levels of social and economic advan-
tage, whereas western Sydney is suburban and has
greater ethnic and cultural diversity. Wollongong is the
administrative centre for the Illawarra/Shoalhaven re-
gion (population 400,000 people), historically semi-rural,
but now rapidly urbanising because of its coastal loca-
tion and proximity to Sydney. Tamworth (population
200,000) is the administrative centre for the large and
comparatively sparsely populated agricultural region of
New England, in north-western NSW.
Participants and recruitment
An independent professional research service (Taverner
Research) was contracted to recruit participants at each
study site, using randomly generated list-based samples of
people who had previously volunteered to take part in re-
search and topic-blinded social media advertising on Face-
book. Jurors were selected from this pool of potential
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participants, based on representative socio-demographic
characteristics (including gender and age); the final com-
position of each jury was determined by individual availabil-
ity and eligibility, to ensure socioeconomic and cultural
diversity within each jury. Fifty people were recruited across
the four study settings (Table 1). All juries included partici-
pants with varied educational levels; the Tamworth jury
was less socially and culturally diverse, reflecting the socio-
demographic characteristics of the region. Jurors received a
modest honorarium of $200 AUD per sitting day in recog-
nition of their participation and contribution.
Procedures
Each jury commenced with an orientation session to
introduce the process and questions for consideration and
obtain written consent. The content and scope of evidence
presented changed between juries as shown in Table 2.
Based on feedback from jurors, new presentations were
added after Juries #1 and #2. Expert presentations were
the same for Juries #3 and #4.
Public deliberation is enhanced by participants having
access to evidence they need to make decisions that re-
flect their values and preferences [64, 65]. Therefore, as
part of post-event evaluations, we asked jurors whether
there were information gaps that should be addressed in
subsequent juries and responded, iteratively, to the rec-
ommendations of each group. Several participants in
Jury#1 told us they would have liked more information
on current practices and protections in research involv-
ing data linkage and the use of Big Data analytics. This
was provided, by adding a presentation on research eth-
ics and data management (Talk 5 in Table 2). Feedback
from participants of Jury #2 prompted inclusion of evi-
dence focusing on risks to privacy of technologically en-
hanced surveillance, for Juries #3 and 4 (Talk 4 in
Table 2), the latter indicated that they were satisfied with
the scope and content of the information provided.
Fig. 1 The question put to the community juries
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Testimony from our panel of experts was pre-recorded
and shown to jurors as video presentations of about 30
min each. In consultation with an advisory group, ex-
perts were selected on the basis of their institutional
roles, experience and expertise. They provided balanced
and factual information supporting different perspectives
on the processes, benefits and potential risks of using
enhanced technology in communicable disease surveil-
lance and research. Pre-recording ensured the evidence
presented was standardised across juries. The experts’
bio-sketches and video presentations are available online
[66]. After each presentation the expert was available by
telephone or in person for question and answer ses-
sions, facilitated by a researcher, which allowed jurors
to clarify or question the evidence and opinions pre-
sented. Facilitation was positioned neutrally, and fo-
cused on promoting constructive dialogue and fair
interaction amongst jurors.
For the first hour of the second day, the juries
reflected on, discussed and debated the evidence, aided
by a researcher acting as facilitator. As was the case in
previous sessions, facilitation was explicitly neutral and
focused on promoting constructive dialogue and fair
interaction amongst jurors. Juries then deliberated for an
hour, without researchers present, to reach a verdict on
the questions posed. Their verdicts, reasoning and any
dissenting views, were reported to the research team in a
final feedback session. Our research and reporting pro-
cesses for these community juries were cross-checked
against the CJChecklist protocol [67].
Data collection and analysis
The four juries are the units of analysis in this study. All jury
deliberations and expert question and answer sessions were
audio-recorded and transcribed. To track changes in posi-
tions held by individual jurors, participants completed an
anonymous ballot three times - after considering evidence
at the end of day one; after overnight reflection at the begin-
ning of day two; and after their deliberation and delivery of
the verdict at the end of day two. Jurors also completed an
exit survey for the purposes of process evaluation, at the
conclusion of each jury. During the final session a re-
searcher recorded the verdict and reasons on a flipchart.
Each point was reviewed by the jury to ensure accuracy.
Transcripts were subsequently reviewed to identify and clar-
ify key reasons why jurors supported or rejected the pre-
sented options. Results summarise jurors’ descriptions of
the rationale and reasoning underpinning their responses.
Results
Table 3 lists the outcomes of the final votes taken at all
four juries. All of the juries supported the linkage of
pathogen WGS data with administrative datasets for pub-
lic health and microbiological research (Option B). The
first three juries also supported application of Big Data an-
alytics to linked pathogenomic and administrative datasets
to enhance communicable disease surveillance (Option C)
– noting that in Jury#3 this was only by a slim majority.
The final jury held in eastern Sydney (Jury #4) voted
against adding research and surveillance to the status quo
(Option C) – once again by a slim majority.
Table 1 Characteristics of Jury participants
Jury 1 (n = 10a) Jury 2 (n = 14) Jury 3 (n = 14) Jury 4 (n = 12a)
Age (years)
18–34 2 4 6 3
35–54 4 7 6 5
> 55 3 3 2 3
Gender
Male 4 6 7 4
Female 5 8 7 7
Highest Educational Attainment
High School 3 3 3 4
Trade / Diploma 2 6 4 2
Bachelor Degree 3 3 5 4
Postgraduate Degree 1 2 2 1
Socio-Economic Status of Place of Residenceb
Low 3 2 2 2
Middle 5 8 12 4
High 2 4 0 5
a1 Participant of the 1st and 4th juries were unable to attend the second day because of illness
bBased on Socio-economic Index for Area (SEIFA
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Table 4 show the balance of the vote changed during the
course of each jury with votes shifting between options A,
B and C after provision of the evidence, overnight and after
deliberation. Support for adding research and surveillance
to the status quo (Option C) increased after participants
had deliberated, but not enough in Jury #4 for this to be-
come the majority position. Notably, all jurors supported
current systems (Option A), such that there were no con-
cerns or conditions stipulated about the use of pathogen
WGS, administrative or publicly available social media data,
during outbreak investigations and response. However, the
support of jurors for using these technologies to enhance
research (Option B) and research and surveillance (Option
C) was contingent on several conditions being met. In what
follows we describe the reasons jurors gave for supporting
or rejecting a particular position, including any qualifying
conditions. We then elaborate on the key points of consen-
sus and disagreement between the juries.
Support for option B (adding research to the status quo)
As well as using WGS technologies for outbreak investi-
gations, there was strong support for routine collection,
storage and linkage of relevant pathogenomic and ad-
ministrative datasets for use in public health and micro-
biological research. However, acceptance of option B
depended on the following accompanying structures and
controls being put in place.
Voluntariness and participation
All 4 deliberative groups were of the view that active con-
sent should not be required, for routine collection of
WGS data of isolates from healthcare users in Australia.
However, rather than allowing a consent waiver, a minor-
ity of jurors made the case that some people will have
strong views against participation, which need to be ac-
commodated. Having considered this requirement, each
community jury independently came to the position that
an ‘opt-out’ consent model was an appropriate comprom-
ise because it allowed individuals to withdraw, while leav-
ing large enough datasets, by default, to maximise public
health and research benefits. Various mechanisms for
opting-out were discussed such as including a box on
pathology request forms for patients to withhold consent
for data-linkage and sharing, or establishing and raising
Table 2 Expert testimony provided to the community juries)
Expertise Expert area Data provided Events where presented
Talk 1 Molecular biology and
diagnostic methods
Molecular Biosciences • the basic characteristics and biological processes
of microbial life and the microbiome
• previous and current techniques used to identify
and understand microbial processes and host/
pathogen interactions
• how microbial whole genome sequencing (WGS)
works and the nature of the information it can
provide
• Western Sydney (Jury#1)
• Wollongong (Jury#2)
• Tamworth (Jury#3)
• Eastern Sydney (Jury#4)





• the goals of outbreak investigations, infectious
disease surveillance and public health research
• why each of these domains of public health
practice are important to population health
• current systems, protocols, and legal controls
employed in outbreak investigations, infectious
disease surveillance and public health research
in NSW, Australia
• Western Sydney (Jury#1)
• Wollongong (Jury#2)
• Tamworth (Jury#3)
• Eastern Sydney (Jury#4)
Talk 3 Public health microbiology Microbiology, Health
Informatics & Infectious
diseases
• the value of microbial genomic data and how
WGS can be used to investigate, control and
prevent infectious disease outbreaks
• the potential public health benefits and ethical
risks of using WGS to enhance communicable
disease surveillance
• Western Sydney (Jury#1)
• Wollongong (Jury#2)
• Tamworth (Jury#3)
• Eastern Sydney (Jury#4)





Data, & Data analytics
• potential benefits and risks of healthcare use
of Big Data, data analytics and data linkage
technologies
• reasons to be concerned about data linkage,
data security and data quality in communicable
disease control and prevention practices
• Tamworth (Jury#3)
• Eastern Sydney (Jury#4)
Talk 5 Bioethics, Public health ethics Research Ethics &
Health technology
assessment
• current systems and best practices for health
research involving data linkage (de-identification
and linkage processes; models for participant
consent)
• ethical issues in using Big Data and Big Data




• Eastern Sydney (Jury#4)
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public awareness about an online registry for people to in-
dicate that they chose to opt-out of the system. None of
the juries came to a definitive position as to how an opt-
out system should be implemented, but all agreed that this
consent model was most appropriate. This consensus was
dependent on the Australian public being informed of the
nature and purpose of any new use of patient data so
people could opt out if they wished.
Governance and funding
There was general agreement that the use of WGS data
from patient isolates for research needs to be supported
by a legislative framework. The National Health and
Medical Research Council, which oversees the Human
Research Ethics Committee system, was considered to
be an appropriate institution to supervise pathogen
WGS-related research activities. Jurors stressed that the
system must be ‘not for profit’ and its governance and
funding operated by a public body. There should be no
selling of pathogenomic data to private interests nor dir-
ect corporate involvement in research. Public health la-
boratories, data custodians and linkage agents that
support research, must be publicly funded to adequately
maintain their integrity and sustainability and obviate a
need for commercial support. At the same time research
involving WGS data must have clear potential benefits
to justify the costs of establishing and operating govern-
ance structures, with research results published in the
public domain.
Privacy, data linkage, data-sharing and security
Overall, none of the deliberative groups were overly con-
cerned about potential privacy implications of pathogen
WGS, if required, to characterise patient isolates. The
technology was seen as a tool to create potentially useful
information that could help save lives through the earlier
identification of infectious disease outbreaks of public
health importance. Jurors were far more concerned with
how data generated were stored and shared and who
could access it. Most important was that these data
should be curated by organisations located in Australia.
In general, jurors wanted only summary data to be
shared internationally. Any linked data must be de-
identified, protected by practices used for other
government-operated administrative datasets, in
Australia, and not publicly accessible, to reduce the risk
of re-identification and protect privacy. Because WGS-
related information could lead to adverse social, legal
and actuarial consequences for individuals, jurors fore-
saw a need for legislation to reassure and protect the
public from its misuse, including heavy penalties to deter
hacking or leaking of data or unauthorised use by com-
mercial (e.g. insurance or news media) organisations. In
addition, individuals who are unwitting vectors of infec-
tion (e.g. of tuberculosis or gonorrhoea) must be indem-
nified, because of the risk of civil litigation, based on
transmission events revealed by WGS.
The key reasons given by the one participant in Tam-
worth who disagreed with adding research to the status
Table 3 The final verdicts of the juries









Option A. - Remain with the status quo: only allow whole genome
sequencing on samples taken from patients in the health system, to
investigate outbreaks of infectious diseases when there is an obvious
threat to public health
0 0 1 0
Option B. - Add research status quo: Allow A. In addition, when
pathology laboratories conduct whole genome sequencing of any
sample taken from a patient, allow the results to be stored in a
collection, without any identifying information about the person
attached. Allow these stored samples to be used for public health
or microbiological research only. Researchers would have to get
approval from a research ethics committee to do research using
the samples. However, the individual patients that the samples
came from would not be asked to give consent for each study.
0 4 5 7
Option C. Add research and surveillance to the status quo,
combining sequencing information with other types of
information: Allow A and B. In addition, allow linkage of data
from whole genome sequencing with other types of data such
as clinical data about a person’s illness and treatment, social
media data, data about their age, location and occupation. This
linked data would be used routinely for public health surveillance
(to detect outbreaks as they emerge) as well as for public health
research. The linking of data and protection of privacy would be
managed by specialist organisations and overseen by research
ethics committees.
9 10 8 4
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quo (Option B) were: (i) mistrust of security of current
administrative data management systems; and (ii) con-
cern about erosion of institutions in liberal democracies,
and the potential for the goals of a data collection sys-
tem to be re-oriented for authoritarian political pro-
cesses. Other participants shared these concerns to
varying degrees but ultimately voted to allow the use of
pathogenomics and data linkage to enhance communic-
able disease research, as long as the conditions described
above were met.
Support for option C (adding research and big-data
informed surveillance to the status quo)
As shown in Table 3 support for using the new tech-
nologies to develop and deploy Big Data- informed com-
municable disease surveillance systems was mixed.
Support in each group for using these technologies for
surveillance increased through deliberation (Table 4).
But the level of support was weaker in the last two juries,
probably due to their being provided with more detailed
and specific evidence about the potential harm from use
of Big Data analytics for surveillance. Nevertheless, all of
the deliberative groups were excited by the potential pub-
lic health value of Big Data analytics and there was quali-
fied support for adding research and surveillance to the
status quo (Option C), to improve health protection. But
across the four groups, even when jurors were willing to
support C, it was with strong conditions and without these
conditions they would withdraw their support. As well as
conditions specified for jurors’ acceptance of pathoge-
nomic and data linkage in research (Option B), these extra
conditions included the following.
Voluntariness and participation
Linkage and centralisation of multiple datasets for rou-
tine surveillance made the deliberative groups more sen-
sitive to the risks to privacy and liberty. They
understood that a public health surveillance system
based on application of Big Data analytics to linked and
constantly updated datasets, would require at least wide
public acceptance. Although jurors recognised that the
public health value of option C would be reduced by in-
complete participation, most felt that people should have
a choice to decline participation if that was their prefer-
ence. Consequently, all four juries were split on whether
it should be an “opt in” or “opt out” system. This was a
key sticking point for many participants; in the last two
juries several participants who supported using pathoge-
nomic and data linkage for public health research, told
us they would have chosen to extend these systems to
public health surveillance if it was explicitly organised as
an opt in system. The same mechanisms for implement-
ing the consent model were raised in these discussions,
without coming to a resolution. Most jurors believed
that decisions about consent were matters of public
interest and should not be made solely by experts.
Therefore, public awareness campaigns and consultation
would be essential to ensure that people understood the
choice and consequences of too few people participating.
Governance and funding
The jurors in each deliberative group who supported the
addition of Big Data analytics to automatically linked
and updated datasets for surveillance (Option C) were of
the view that such a system would require ministerial
oversight and other checks and balances, such as regular
monitoring and auditing by an independent statutory of-
ficer, analogous to an ombudsmen or privacy commis-
sioner. All of the deliberative groups concluded that the
transparency system to the public was important. The
need for transparency extended to algorithms used to
monitor data for the purposes of surveillance, including
how algorithms work, how they were developed, by whom,
and for what goal. This information and any changes must
be publicly available in plain language. Because such a sys-
tem could potentially be misused for political aims, all ju-
rors thought the operating body and related data-linkage
agencies, would need to be protected by robust supporting
legislation to protect its regulatory independence. These
supporting structures were regarded as important to make
changing the purpose or practices of surveillance difficult
and remove the role and remit of the operating organisa-
tion from politics. Finally, the intrusiveness of a system
that tracked peoples’ day-to-day activities and could
threaten their privacy meant that demonstrating effective-
ness was important.
Security, linkage and data-sharing
The jurors who supported technologically enhancing
communicable disease surveillance (Option C) within
each deliberative group were generally of the view that
because commercial agencies already collect personal
data for financial gain, allowing public health authorities
to collect data for the public good was not that much of
change. Nevertheless, there was disagreement within
each group about the types of data that should be
allowed to be perpetually linked for the purposes of syn-
dromic surveillance. There was strong support for inclu-
sion of pathogenomic and administrative health data in
routine surveillance, but disagreement about extending
the scope of surveillance by linking them to, for ex-
ample, passively generated geospatial, retail and social
media data. All participants believed that non-
administrative datasets should be linked only when it
was clearly “necessary” for health protection. There were
differing positions on what thresholds or conditions
should define “necessity” and on the balance of trade-
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offs between potential benefits and risks of including dif-
ferent types of data.
Participants who supported option C required clarity
about data security, where and for how long data would
be stored and who would have rightful access. Central to
this were assurances of robust systems and penalties for
non-compliance or misuse. Jurors believed that data
should not be stored in perpetuity but should be deleted
if no longer useful for actionable surveillance; they were
also reluctant for surveillance data generated and stored
in Australia to be shared with international agencies, un-
less absolutely necessary to manage a disease threat.
Reasons not to extend to option C
The most important objection to option C was that, in
the absence of a clear and present threat to public
health, too much personal information would be avail-
able centrally, on the promise of future benefits. There
were also concerns about the use of Big Data analytics
to underpin surveillance; collection of so much data in
one place would make dual use possible and create a
‘honey-pot’ for external and internal actors with malign
intentions. Within each deliberative group there were ju-
rors who took the position that because data security
could not be guaranteed, caution is needed at the
current stage of development; once established, such a
system would be difficult to change.
Jurors who rejected option C believed that the current
configuration of Australian public health and health pro-
tection systems were already meeting population needs,
and did not require enhancement, unless demonstrable
benefits could be realised, in the face of a major threat.
They argued that Australian health authorities do not
need to lead the development and application of Big
Data analytics to surveillance, but could take advantage
of other jurisdictions’ experience and improved technol-
ogy as it emerges in other countries.
Differences between juries
Support for option B was consistent across all juries.
However, variations in strength of support for different
options, between juries, suggests that the addition of
more detailed information, about practices and govern-
ance of data-linkage processes (Jury #2 onwards) and po-
tential risks of Big Data analytics (Jury #3 onwards),
softened support for option C in later juries. If we regard
the first two juries as pilot studies, the verdicts of the
last two indicate that the application of Big Data analyt-
ics to perpetually linked datasets for communicable dis-
ease surveillance is likely to be highly controversial –
especially if people do not fully understand its purpose
or what is entailed in the establishment of such a system.
Remembering that the task of jurors was to respond to
the question and the evidence presented, through
reflection, discussion and debate, the reasons given by
Juries #1 and #2 for not supporting option C were also
raised and discussed by Juries #3 and #4, but given
greater weight by the latter.
The key differences between the groups were that
more participants in Juries #1 and #2 saw the risks
entailed by technologically enhanced communicable dis-
ease systems as being amenable to effective governance.
In contrast, more participants in Juries #3 and #4 were
concerned with the way in which data was stored, de-
identified and protected. Differences in the socio-
demographic characteristics of each deliberative group
may explain this variation. But our impression during
jury proceedings – which a review of the transcripts sup-
ports – was that exposure to detailed information and
real examples demonstrating the current risks and limi-
tations of data security arrangements, in Talk 4 (see ref-
erence [66] for details), appears to have made
participants far less convinced that the potential public
health benefits are worth the level of intrusion into how
they conduct their day-to-day lives. Therefore, as delib-
erative groups, the final two juries were far more cau-
tious about surrendering their privacy without clear
evidence of effectiveness.
Discussion
Our findings indicate that an informed public is likely to
support the routine collection, linkage and use of admin-
istrative and pathogenomic data for the purposes of pub-
lic health research. Participants were not overly troubled
by the potential implications for people’s privacy of
using WGS technologies to characterise the relationship
between isolates taken from patients. Pathogen WGS
was generally seen as being a powerful new test, the re-
sults of which could be managed under the same confi-
dentiality protection that governed the sharing of other
forms of personal health information by researchers and
health professionals. Linking pathogen WGS data in a
research context was also relatively uncontroversial be-
cause linkages between datasets were one-off bespoke
events. Jurors were by and large content with the sys-
tems that govern data collection and sharing in health
research in Australia.
However, juries made a strong distinction between re-
search and surveillance such that the incorporation of
these technologies into existing systems could cause
controversy. While most jurors expressed excitement at
the potential benefits of combing pathogen WGS with
event-based data surveillance systems, there were also
significant concerns. Most of this uneasiness was focused
on the privacy risks and potential harms of the perpetual
linkage and holding of multiple forms of data within a
single system. For some participants, while the potential
benefits of technologically enhancing communicable
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disease surveillance were understood, it was not obvious
that the current system needed to be enhanced. Notably,
the process of deliberation increased support for using
these technologies to enhance communicable disease
surveillance, because participants were able to articulate
their concerns and think through different conditions
that would need to be met for them to accept its imple-
mentation. However, as the weaker levels of support for
Option C in the final two juries shows, the more people
understand the risks, the less likely they are to support
surveillance. Our results suggest that people intuitively
react against being subjected to surveillance and, when
they have more information, they become more hostile
to implementation. But, if they talk with peers who are
strong advocates of the benefits of surveillance, they are
willing to soften their stance. Accordingly, most of the
conditions imposed by jurors were designed to increase
data protection and reduce the risk of data and privacy
breaches, including limiting linkage to data held within
health systems, and imposing strong governance
conditions.
The outcomes of citizens’ juries held in the United
Kingdom that considered data-linkage in the context of
public health research are consistent with our findings.
Most jurors at these UK events also wanted individuals
to have the right to ‘opt out’ of data sharing arrange-
ments and became less sceptical about health data shar-
ing for public health research, as they became better
informed of its benefits and risks [61]. They also wanted
data to only be provided to organizations that could
demonstrate that the primary goal for using the data was
public benefit (either for new treatments or to improve
existing services). For data-sharing at least our results are
similar, as establishing an ‘opt-out’ system was preferred by
most jurors in the current study for reasons of effectiveness,
diversity and inclusion. Noting the citizens’ jury in the UK
did not discuss the use of data-linkage in infectious disease
surveillance, participants at our events became more scep-
tical about employing these technologies as more context-
ual information was added about the conditions of
implementation. Evidence of potential harms was made less
explicit for first 2 juries, and support for option C waned
substantially once this evidence was formally introduced.
Our findings highlight that people do not assess security
enhancing technologies - such as surveillance - in abstract
terms but in relation to the specific institutional and social
context of implementation [68]. As shown by previous de-
liberative research [61, 69], people accept some loss of priv-
acy for public benefits in specific circumstances.
Our findings highlight that surveillance systems are gen-
erally expected to be implemented in conditions consistent
with strong public engagement and democratic processes,
including clear public communication and strong transpar-
ency around data holding, use and analysis. Surveillance of
various kinds is arguably becoming the norm, driven by
both governments and corporations. In both democratic
and non-democratic countries Closed Circuit TV (CCTV)
is increasingly having facial recognition functions added
[70]; internet usage is, as a Forbes journalist recently wrote,
“designed to be a surveillance machine” rather than being
“private by design” [71]. This is NOT occurring in line with
the strict governance requirements that these juries recom-
mended. The fact that people were more likely to reject
surveillance when they understood more about it suggests
that the existing forms of surveillance, were they to be more
transparent, may also be rejected unless there was an ex-
tremely convincing public benefit- argument and effective
independent oversight. The governance of public health
systems tends to be more open than average and this pro-
ject is an example of such a governance system being will-
ing to engage with the public about the challenges it faces.
There is an irony here. By seeking public input into surveil-
lance system design, we could end up with tighter controls
on a surveillance system that might be more likely to offer
public benefit than many of the commercially oriented sur-
veillance systems already in place. But, precisely because
public health is about the common good and relies on
trusting relationships between publics and governance sys-
tems, arguably public health authorities should uphold the
highest possible standards to preserve trust. This process
could however also be seen as a wakeup call for all the
other state and non-state actors engaging in non-
transparent surveillance.
The importance of evidence of organisational trust-
worthiness to the public acceptability of data-sharing
and linkage has been shown in the UK [54, 61, 72] and
internationally [73, 74]. Participants in the current study
were initially resistant to allowing greater data-linkage in
research but changed their position during the course of
the event. But rather than simply trusting that the ap-
propriate systems would be put in place, during their de-
liberations support among jurors very much depended
on efforts to establish and sustain the trustworthiness of
the system [64]. These included assurances and clarity
about where the data goes and who would have access,
the transparency of the operating and data-linking or-
ganisation, and the imposition of independent oversight
and appropriate checks and balances. Any suggestion of
private sector involvement or commercialisation of any
of these systems was unanimously rejected across all
four of the study settings. Public refusal of commercial
involvement in the curation or analysis of data for public
health purposes has been found elsewhere [51, 53, 73].
In principle, acceptance of new technologies and a
willingness to trust their governing institutions is rela-
tively easy to obtain. However, this underlying willing-
ness does not necessarily translate into high levels of
support for their implementation. The view that publics
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need to be educated so that they trust science and its
governance is shifting. It is increasingly recognised that
in order to establish the trustworthiness of new institu-
tions, publics need to be actively involved in key policy
decisions about the nature, content and scope of their
activities [37, 64]. In their study of the governance of
biobanks in Canada, O’Doherty and colleagues [75] iden-
tified several necessary conditions and institutional ar-
rangements and qualities that work to establish
trustworthy models of governance for new institutions.
It is notable that, in their deliberations seeking to ad-
dress the question asked of them, all four of these juries
derived similar necessary conditions for the establish-
ment of a new, potentially highly intrusive surveillance
system. Table 5 is an adaptation of the criteria they de-
veloped that is applicable to other forms data-collection,
aggregation and storage. Because O’Doherty and col-
leagues [75] established these principles in one context,
and they were produced more or less de-novo by our de-
liberative groups in a different context, it is arguable that
they capture something at the core of what citizens hold
to be important. Incorporating highly structured pro-
cesses for public deliberation and exchange, between
mini-publics, practitioners and policy-makers, can sup-
port the development of knowledge that is essential to
establishing [64, 76]:
(i) the agenda of what is important and needs to be
considered when new technologies are
implemented,
(ii) standards of practice that are transparent
acceptable to the public, and, more broadly,
(iii)mechanisms that create and then maintain trustworthy
systems of governance for public institutions.
As such the content and outcomes of our project and
those conducted by the group in Canada [64, 75] could
be a model for a form of participatory governance that
enriches policies and practices by formalising a role for
civil society in the governance of public institutions, es-
pecially those such as biobanking and data-linked re-
search where surveillance activities can slide in by
default.
Study strengths and limitations
Community juries are a deliberative method that involve
a process of iterative two-way exchange of information
between members of the public and experts. By provid-
ing extensive information from a range of experts, and
ensuring conditions for reasonable and extended debate,
independent community juries elicit more considered
judgements than other social research methods such as
surveys or focus groups. The sample size is small, but
this is necessary for high-quality deliberation. A possible
limitation is that the evidence presented changed be-
tween Jury#1 and Jury#3 in response to participant feed-
back asking for more detailed evidence on the potential
risks of technologically enhancing communicable disease
surveillance systems. Because all four deliberative groups
articulated similar positions and conditions for accepting
system implementation, the new evidence changed the
balance of the vote in the final verdict, and not the sets
of reasons participants had for accepting or rejecting
system implementation. A strength of this study was the
quality and reputation of the experts who gave testi-
mony, and the process by which they moderated one an-
other’s presentations until all experts could accept that
all views presented could be argued from the evidence.
Conclusion
In conclusion, participants across all four events strongly
supported the use of data linkage and pathogenomics for
public health research, under current research governance
structures, and for surveillance and outbreak investigation
of diseases of public health significance. Combining patho-
gen WGS with event-based data surveillance systems,
however, is likely to be controversial. Without clear mech-
anisms to establish and sustain the trustworthiness of a
syndromic surveillance system, the broader public will be
distrustful of its purposes and goals, even when the poten-
tial public health benefits are clear.
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